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10 February 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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USSR: [] Moscow may be planning to release U-2 pilot Gary Powers, in spite of the security consideration involved, as a further gesture toward improving relations with the US. []

[] Powers would be released "within three weeks." []

[] At the end of the Powers trial the chairman of the Moscow Lawyers Collegium told American attorneys that US-Soviet relations would improve in coming months and a commutation or remission of Powers' sentence might then be possible. Powers' Soviet defense attorney told US lawyers that he would file application for commutation of sentence "at an appropriate time." []

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
USSR-Indonesia:

[redacted] under the [redacted]

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Soviet-Indonesian arms pact signed in Moscow on 6 January the USSR agreed to deliver high-performance TU-16 jet bombers, MIG-21 jet fighters, and air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles to Indonesia in 1961 and 1962.

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Indonesian ability to absorb and effectively use this modern equipment will depend on the USSR's carrying through a training program, which is outlined in the agreement, in the use of this equipment and also on an improved Indonesian maintenance and logistic capability. The Indonesians are now able to utilize less than 30 percent of bloc jet aircraft delivered under the 1958 arms deal. It is, of course, possible that the Indonesians may find the more advanced air force equipment too expensive and time consuming to maintain and use and therefore may subsequently request a modification of the agreement. However, the past pattern of such Soviet agreements suggests that the USSR will for its part carry out the terms of the agreement. The more favorable terms of this agreement were also reportedly extended to cover the [redacted] naval equipment pact concluded in September 1960. Since Khrushchev's visit to Indonesia in February 1960, Moscow has sought to develop cordial relations with Djakarta while exploiting President Sukarno's aspiration to be considered a leader of the Afro-Asian bloc. [redacted]

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
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France-Algeria: [The prospective meeting between De Gaulle and Tunisian President Bourguiba, seen by De Gaulle as a means of preparing the way for negotiations with the Algerian rebels, could complicate French relations with the rebels. The rebel government has almost certainly not authorized Bourguiba to discuss any substantive aspects of the Algerian problem, and one of its officials already has expressed resentment of what he terms Bourguiba's "newspaper diplomacy." Bourguiba himself seems uneasy over the loss of prestige he will suffer if the encounter with De Gaulle is without real results, but he is anxious to gain credit for promoting a settlement. He has therefore asked the US and UK to encourage the French to be forthcoming.]

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Portugal: The riots in Angola over the week end of 4-5 February have aroused further criticism of the Salazar regime from its supporters. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has [REDACTED] charged that the government's present policy in Africa is designed to protect a few important commercial interests and has

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[REDACTED] there is widespread dissatisfaction with Salazar among army officers and has stated that some move against him may be made in the next few weeks. [REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED] (Backup, Page 4)

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
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Soviet Military Aid to Indonesia

[Moscow, in keeping with its past performance in certain other underdeveloped countries--such as the UAR, Afghanistan, and even Yemen--apparently is willing for political reasons to provide modern weapons to the Indonesian armed forces regardless of Indonesian ability to utilize such materiel.]

[Since the Soviet Union's extension of a \$250,000,000 economic credit to Indonesia during Khrushchev's visit to Djakarta last February, Moscow has engaged in a program with far-reaching political implications to ensure Soviet participation in Indonesia's economic and military development. It has effectively capitalized on the Indonesian President's sensitivity to what he considers US hostility to himself. The Soviet Union probably hopes that this approach, combined with its economic aid and well over [redacted] in military assistance since February 1960, will strengthen Sukarno's resolve to bring members of the Indonesian Communist party into his cabinet.]

[Previously the anti-Communist posture of Army Chief of Staff General Nasution and the Indonesian Army had forestalled Sukarno's intentions in this regard. However, on Sukarno's orders, General Nasution led the Indonesian mission to Moscow in January which resulted in the army's acceptance for the first time of a substantial amount of bloc military equipment. Moscow may feel that Nasution's acceptance of this materiel will undercut his opposition to President Sukarno's plans. In addition, [redacted] Soviet officials also impressed Nasution with their support of Indonesia's intention to recover West New Guinea.]

[Since the conclusion of the January arms agreement, Moscow radio has launched a steady propaganda barrage in support of Indonesia's position on Guinea. Subandrio told the US ambassador in Djakarta that accommodation with the bloc "had been unavoidable" since no alternative was available to the Soviet offer of political support on the question of New Guinea. Moscow probably hopes that Soviet assurances of continued full diplomatic support for Djakarta in the New Guinea campaign will strengthen the Communist party in Indonesia in its efforts to expand its role throughout all levels of the government.]

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Dissatisfaction of Portuguese Military
With Salazar Regime

[redacted] the political situation in Portugal was very bad and that drastic changes were needed in its African policy. [redacted] the military, while able to handle disorders of the kind that took at least 31 lives in Angola over the previous week end, could not solve the African problem by repression or cope with a general uprising. [redacted] Portugal must henceforth give satisfaction to "valid complaints" from overseas on the part of both Portuguese and Africans.

Dissatisfaction among the armed forces with Salazar's policies is further reflected in an 8 February statement to the US consul in Oporto by an [redacted] who had predicted Salazar's fall six weeks before the abortive coup of March 1959 that "a military movement" against the premier had been expected last week. [redacted]

[redacted] such a move was being "freely" discussed at a military base near Lisbon, and said it might take place in the next few weeks. However, the US Embassy in Lisbon reports its service attachés have received no impression of an early attempt at a coup from contacts in the upper level of defense officials and among the middle and junior ranks of the armed forces, where it believes such a move would be most likely to originate.

On 6 February three leaders of a group which had signed a letter calling on President Thomaz to grant Portugal a government willing to restore the fundamental liberties, told Thomaz personally, [redacted] that if he wanted to rally Portuguese popular support in the face of a deteriorating domestic situation and threats to the overseas provinces, he would have to dismiss Salazar and bring some of the opposition into the government. Similar views reportedly have long been held by junior and even some high-ranking military officers. [redacted]

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Director, The Joint Staff

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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